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The Anti-Federalists’ Toughest
Challenge
Paper Money, Debt Relief, and the Ratification
of the Constitution
G E O R G E W I L L I A M VA N C L E V E

During the mid-1780s many American states actively managed their economies in the face of widespread financial and social instability following the Revolutionary War. Seven states authorized paper
money emissions, and there were unsuccessful efforts to obtain them in
others. Several states adopted extensive debtor-relief measures. Some
historians of these state anti-recession measures conclude that such
efforts to fight deflation, increase money circulation, and protect debtors
were beneficial for various reasons. But despite that, the Constitution, as
contemporaries understood it, abrogated state powers to issue paper
money or provide debtor relief such as property tender laws in Article I,
Section 10. Terry Bouton writes that Section 10 ‘‘left a host of popular
policies in ruins—all in less than fifty words. . . . [it] created a tidal shift
in power that favored the interests of moneyed Americans (and European
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financiers) over ordinary Americans.’’ Moreover, contemporary observers saw Section 10 as a major weakening of state sovereignty.1
Nevertheless, Anti-Federalists in the eleven originally ratifying states
were often silent on Section 10 despite Federalist claims that it was one
of the Constitution’s most important provisions. However, they did make
various attacks tailored to local circumstances. For example, some AntiFederalists argued that it harmed states; others, that it was also bad policy that favored the wealthy and would hurt ordinary citizens. Ultimately,
though, Anti-Federalists did not propose a single amendment to change
its key provisions in any of the thirteen states. What light can this sharp
disparity between widespread support for economic management and
the remarkably constrained public opposition to Section 10 shed on
Anti-Federalism and the ratification of the Constitution? Past answers to
this question have usually depended heavily on a historian’s perspective
on what was at stake, who the Anti-Federalists were, and what they stood
for.2

1. Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: ‘‘The People,’’ the Founders, and the
Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (Oxford, UK, 2007), 178. For influential views of this period see Merrill P. Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the
United States during the Confederation, 1781–1789 (New York, 1950); Richard
B. Morris, The Forging of the Union (New York, 1987). See Thomas K. McCraw,
The Founders and Finance (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 375n4, for sources on economic conditions. States issuing paper currency were Rhode Island, New York,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Edwin
J. Perkins, American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700–1815 (Columbus, OH, 1994), 143. John P. Kaminski, Paper Politics: The Northern State LoanOffices During the Confederation, 1783–1790 (New York, 1989); Perkins, American Public Finance; Jensen, New Nation. Constitution ended state powers: Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Columbian Herald (Charleston, SC), Feb. 14, 1788, in The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, ed. Merrill Jensen
et al. (26 vols., Madison, WI, 1976–) (hereafter DHRC) 13: 274n1. State sovereignty impaired: Antoine de la Forest to Comte de Montmorin, Sept. 28, 1787,
DHRC 13: 259.
2. Mary M. Schweitzer, ‘‘State-Issued Currency and the Ratification of the
U.S. Constitution,’’ Journal of Economic History 49 (June 1989), 320–21; Jackson
Turner Main, The Anti-federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788 (1961;
repr. New York, 1974), 165–67, 267–78. J. Willard Hurst, A Legal History of
Money in the United States, 1774–1970 (Lincoln, NE, 1971), 9. North Carolina
proposed an amendment to protect its existing paper money, DHRC 18: 319, 25
(reaffirmed during ratification), as did Rhode Island, DHRC 26: 979.
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Charles A. Beard, for example, famously asserted that economic forces
played a central role in the Constitution’s creation. On ratification, his
primary conclusion was that ‘‘personalty’’ property owners and their
allies engaged in rent-seeking were its main supporters, while those who
lacked property or had other forms of it, including many paper money
supporters, were its principal opponents. For Beard, Section 10 was
central to ratification. He contended that popular forces lost largely
because the process was illegitimate. He argued that ratification’s franchise was unrepresentative; that the convention process and media were
manipulated by Federalists to prevent a fair contest; and that some
delegates and states accepted the Constitution due to extraneous considerations such as economic coercion. Later historians advanced other
explanations for ratification, including social, generational, ideological,
and state-building theories, and were thus far less interested in the controversy over Section 10.3
Pauline Maier’s ratification history avoids taking sides in that historiographical debate. Instead, she begins by canvassing various process arguments, many similar to Beard’s, and endorses some, such as Federalist
media dominance and pressure to rush to judgment. Maier’s work shows
that groups generally favoring the Constitution included city residents,
commercial interests, and large federal creditors. Though she describes
Anti-Federalism as a spectrum of opinions, Maier portrays ratification
not as a series of conflicts between different social or economic groups
but instead as a series of largely distinct contests between shifting interest
groups, often influenced by local concerns. Particularly on the paper
money issue, with the exceptions of Rhode Island and North Carolina,
she repeatedly notes the lack of debate over it without offering any explanation, implying that it played little role nationally. As a result, her work
3. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (1913; repr. New York, 1941), 50–51, 237–38, 250–52. For a critique,
see Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution
(Chicago, 1958). For the contention that ratification is better understood as a
‘‘complex social phenomenon and communicative process,’’ see Jürgen Heideking,
The Constitution before the Judgment Seat: The Prehistory and Ratification of the
Constitution, 1787–1791, ed. John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler (Charlottesville, VA, 2012), 3. For the historiography, see the thoughtful review and analysis
of Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788
(New York, 2010) in Michael Klarman, ‘‘The Founding Revisited,’’ Harvard Law
Review 125 (Dec. 2011), 553–54.
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adds relatively little to our understanding of ratification’s economic
dimensions.4
Studies of ratification by Saul Cornell and David Waldstreicher provide additional insight into the nature of Anti-Federalism. They show
that during the 1780s those who later became Anti-Federalists characteristically sought to defend a series of localist values including state
sovereignty and communitarian, consensual democratic governance. The
states’ adoption of paper money exemplified such values, Waldstreicher
argues. From this perspective, ratification was a clash over whether conflicting values that served elite social and economic interests, such as
those embodied in Section 10, would become politically and culturally
hegemonic.5
Woody Holton and Terry Bouton offer alternative explanations for
ratification and Section 10’s fate focused on the battle over popular support for economic reforms. Holton’s primary claim is that popular forces
lost because the Constitution offered major state tax relief and bondholder repayment—which bought off opponents while rewarding friends,
thus neutralizing the paper money issue. Bouton claims that popular
forces were sold out by elite Anti-Federalists who were often corrupted
by the Constitution’s financial inducements, preventing strong opposition.6
4. Maier, Ratification: media dominance, 70–95; rush to judgment, 97–107.
Anti-Federalists, spectrum, 93. Paper money, 160, 189, 208; in Rhode Island:
224; North Carolina, 415–19. For the social groupings in Maier’s treatment, see
Klarman, ‘‘The Founding Revisited,’’ 556–57.
5. Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999). David Waldstreicher, In
the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820
(Chapel Hill, NC, 1997), 63–64, 86–90; David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York, 2009), 110–13, 123–51,
passim. Cornell usefully divides Anti-Federalists into three broad socioeconomic
categories—back-country farmers and artisans; the ‘‘middling sort’’; and elite
politicians—with distinctive perspectives and claims. Cornell, Other Founders, 48–
49, 61–65, 81–87.
6. Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New
York, 2007), 249–51, 227–43 and 14–16, 57–61. Heideking thinks fear of federal
taxation and loss of paper money motivated many Anti-Federalists. Heideking,
Constitution, 249–50. Bouton, Taming Democracy, 188–92. Main concluded that
Anti-Federalists were silent because they were divided. Main, Anti-federalists,
267–78. Other explanations rely on perceptions of paper money or the rise of
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To summarize, histories of ratification differ markedly on whether the
fight over Section 10 was central or peripheral to its outcome. They
examine claims about Federalists’ corruption of the process and agenda
that some argue explain why Section 10 (or the Constitution) survived
ratification. But despite disagreements, they commonly assume that no
state-level change in the politics of paper money had occurred before the
Constitutional Convention.
This article reexamines the politics of paper money and the AntiFederalists’ response to Section 10, and argues instead that they were
intimately connected and provide considerable insight into the AntiFederalists’ loss. In three of seven states that adopted paper money
laws—Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey—their popularity was
limited, so they could be adopted only by ‘‘strange bedfellow’’ coalitions
that included public creditors. Opposition to paper money laws then
increased in Pennsylvania and was strongly reinforced elsewhere for two
reasons. Such laws became imbricated in a wider struggle over the limits
of republican majoritarianism and were badly tarred by what many contemporaries viewed as Rhode Island’s egregious abuses. The Constitution’s tax provisions then fractured earlier coalitions in the three midAtlantic states by sharply improving federal bondholders’ prospects of
full payment.
The widely varying Anti-Federalist responses to Section 10 (which
even included some support) did not happen because Anti-Federalist
leaders were self-interested, or because they or their followers had
changed their views. Nor did they occur because on that issue Federalists
had manipulated the ratification process or distorted the public agenda.
Instead, the Anti-Federalists’ behavior strongly suggests that they concluded that in attacking Section 10 they were on treacherous ground and
that their cause would not benefit—and might even lose support—from
aggressively advocating what had become an unpopular position in a
clear majority of states. The Anti-Federalists made the strongest challenge possible in very difficult circumstances.
commercial banking. Charles W. Calomiris, ‘‘Institutional Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the Continental,’’ Journal of Economic History 48
(Mar. 1988), 47–68; Calvin Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The
Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution (Cambridge, UK, 2005), 208; Robert E.
Wright, The Origins of Commercial Banking in America, 1750–1800 (Lanham,
MD, 2001), 85–86; Schweitzer, ‘‘State-Issued Currency.’’

................. 18639$

$CH1

10-30-14 10:49:59

PS

PAGE 533

534

•

JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC (Winter 2014)

The article begins by describing American colonial paper money issuance. It then offers a systematic comparison of key features of the differing politics of the paper money laws adopted in various states. Next, it
considers how and why the Constitution’s state paper money ban was
adopted. The final section provides new evidence on the ratification
debate over paper money followed by conclusions.



During the eighteenth century, American colonies issued several forms
of paper money, a process then commonly called emitting bills of credit.
There were two major types of emission. The first involved bills of credit
that today might be called ‘‘tax anticipation notes,’’ a form of government
borrowing often referred to by later historians as ‘‘currency finance.’’
Such bills circulated as a form of money. The second type was a colonial
‘‘loan-office’’ (or ‘‘land banking’’) program, in which bills of credit issued
by a colony were appropriated for use by its government loan office,
which used them to fund loans made to borrowers. The bills were then
useable as currency. On a case-by-case basis, the British government
permitted colonies to issue both forms of paper money before about
1750.7
By 1751, however, Rhode Island’s excessive issuance of paper money
caused complaints—from merchants and other colonies—that led Parliament to clamp down. The Currency Act of 1751 barred future issuance
of ‘‘any Paper Bills or Bills of Credit, of any Kind or Denomination
whatsoever,’’ by any New England colony except to meet ‘‘Emergencies
of Government, in case of War and Invasion,’’ and to provide ‘‘current
Service’’ government operating funds. Future bill issues had to be
backed by ‘‘ample and sufficient’’ tax sinking funds and called in within
five years at most. Bills could not be made legal tender for payment of
any private debt (e.g., a mortgage). In 1764, Parliament extended even
7. For the colonial history see Leslie V. Brock, The Currency of the American
Colonies, 1700–1764: A Study in Colonial Finance and Imperial Relations (New
York, 1975) (different types of bills, 18–20); Joseph Albert Ernst, Money and
Politics in America, 1755–1775 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973). For ‘‘currency finance,’’
see E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public
Finance, 1776–1790 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1961), 10. Merchants also issued private
payment notes (usually called ‘‘bills of exchange’’), and these circulated as an
important form of currency.
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more stringent currency regulation to all American colonies, providing
that they could not issue paper money as legal tender for either public
or private debts (a restriction modified in 1773).8
Some prominent American eighteenth-century leaders, such as Benjamin
Franklin, regarded paper money emissions, particularly for land bank
purposes, as successful ways to stabilize colonial economies. Others regarded them either as inherently damaging to creditors or as susceptible
to abuse. British and American merchants interested in the financial
effects of such paper money proposals sometimes supported and sometimes opposed them. British policy vacillated depending on colonial and
merchant politics. But during the late eighteenth century, issuing paper
money for various public purposes subject to appropriate conditions
(such as a dedicated tax fund for repayment) was a widely accepted tool
of economic policy in the American colonies.9
The mid-1780s paper money laws were often popular. Jackson Turner
Main’s data show that on average paper money and debt-relief laws
received support from about 58 percent of legislators in the states he
surveyed. But these averages conceal fundamentally important variations
between the states. In some, such as South Carolina, the laws had a high
level of public support, including most merchants. In others, such as
North Carolina and Rhode Island, there was majority legislative support
for paper money but also vocal minority opposition and obstruction,
often from merchants. In three others—Pennsylvania, New York, and
New Jersey—public opinion was sharply divided, and urban merchants
were strongly opposed.10
States that adopted paper money also differed over whether it was
made legal tender, an often controversial issue. Though it would be mistaken to reduce this era’s conflicts to debtor–creditor clashes, Main’s
work shows that states took significantly different approaches to debt
problems as well. Some paper states also stayed debt enforcement or

8. ‘‘An Act to Regulate and Restrain Paper Bills of Credit. . . ,’’ The Statutes
at Large from Magna Charta to 1763, Vol. 7 (London, 1769), 403–404. Ernst,
Money and Politics, 40–41. Designating bills as ‘‘legal tender’’ meant that they
could be used to pay private debts without creditors’ consent, not just public
debts such as taxes.
9. Perkins, American Public Finance, 39.
10. Jackson Turner Main, Political Parties before the Constitution (Chapel Hill,
NC, 1973), Table 12.6, votes 4–6, 336–38 (surveying four to six states’ votes).
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allowed debtors to tender property in payment of money debts. Other
states such as Virginia refused to adopt paper money but provided major
debt relief. At the spectrum’s other end, Massachusetts steadfastly
refused to adopt either type of measure. The following discussion of
state politics focuses on key differences that became important during
ratification.11
In response to widespread popular unrest, in 1785 South Carolina
created a land bank system that made loans using state paper money. It
issued £100,000 in currency, which was not made legal tender. Unlike
merchants in many states, South Carolina merchants were generally supportive of the paper currency, and sources suggest it held its value reasonably well. The state also provided broader relief by enabling debtors
to tender real property to creditors in lieu of paying debts in money,
through a law commonly called the ‘‘Pine Barren Act.’’ State leaders
justified their actions on the basis that democratic majorities had power
to take necessary actions to protect the public good. The Speaker of the
South Carolina House of Representatives, John Julius Pringle, said, ‘‘Vox
Populi Vox Dei. . . . The ends and purposes of government implicitly
give . . . a right to modify and supercede such contracts when the good
of the community requires.’’12
In Georgia, an £50,000 paper emission was authorized in August,
1786, to relieve a currency shortage and finance a possible war with the

11. Four of the seven states—New Jersey, Georgia, Rhode Island, and North
Carolina—granted legal tender status. Schweitzer, ‘‘State-Issued Currency,’’ 312;
Main, Political Parties, 335. For debtor-creditor conflicts, see Main, Political Parties, 60–66. For Virginia debtor protection, see Emory G. Evans, ‘‘Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia, 1776 to 1796,’’ William and Mary
Quarterly 28 (July 1971), 349–74. For Massachusetts, see Roger H. Brown,
Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution
(Baltimore, 1993), 113–19; Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American
Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia, 2002).
12. Robert A. Becker, ‘‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex: Public Peace and South
Carolina Debtor Relief Laws, 1783–1788,’’ South Carolina Historical Magazine
80 (Jan. 1979), 74. Walter Edgar, South Carolina, A History (Columbia, SC,
1998), 247. Holton, Unruly Americans, 113. McDonald, We the People, 388. The
use of the symbol ‘‘£’’ in this article means ‘‘pound’’ but refers in each instance
only to whichever state’s currency is being discussed; i.e., £1,000 in a discussion
of South Carolina means 1,000 South Carolina pounds.
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Creek Indians. The legislature was sharply divided on it, and lowcountry residents and others distant from the Indian threat tended to
oppose it. Only £30,000 was actually issued; it was secured by projected
sales of lands still held by Indians. Many Savannah merchants and
mechanics agreed not to accept the paper money despite its legal tender
status. It quickly lost value, falling to four-to-one against specie by 1787.
Its legal tender status was revoked as of 1790.13
Merrill Jensen describes the contest over the North Carolina 1785
emission as ‘‘a clear cut fight between debtor farmers and planters on the
one hand, and the merchants and a few wealthy planters on the other’’
that resulted in a ‘‘sweeping victory for the debtors.’’ The £100,000
emission was made legal tender. The emission’s management was a tragedy of errors. The state used a third of the money to buy tobacco for
resale, but instead had to resell it for a fraction of what it had paid.
Merchants refused to take the paper money; some even developed their
own currency. Merchant resistance was so strong that sometimes use of
paper money by those regarded as ‘‘evil-minded’’ persons led to ‘‘broken
heads.’’ State officials and private citizens responsible for the money were
charged with corruption. Jensen concludes that ‘‘the combination of corruption, opposition, and depreciation gave the state’s currency almost as
bad a reputation as that of Rhode Island.’’14
The politics of paper money were qualitatively different, however, in
Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. In them, even moderate economic relief programs could be adopted only by creating coalitions. Following is a sketch of these states’ paper money politics.15
In Pennsylvania, in 1784 there were unsuccessful efforts to legislate
state paper money, but it would not have helped public creditors. In

13. Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763–1789
(Athens, GA, 1958), 214. George R. Lamplugh, Politics on the Periphery: Factions
and Parties in Georgia, 1783–1806 (Newark, DE, 1986), 54. Jensen, New Nation,
323.
14. Jensen, New Nation, 319–20; James R. Morrill, The Practice and Problems
of Fiat Finance: North Carolina in the Confederation, 1783–1789 (Chapel Hill,
NC, 1969), 68–69; Jensen, New Nation, 320.
15. For a detailed history of paper money controversies in these states, see
Kaminski, Paper Politics. For this coalition analysis, I am indebted to Perkins,
American Public Finance, 144.
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1785, the Constitutionalist party-dominated Pennsylvania legislature
authorized a currency issue of £150,000. The bill created a loan office
that would loan about one-third of the paper money to borrowers. Twothirds of Pennsylvania’s issue was designated to pay interest on the state’s
securities, which included assumed federal debts owed to residents.16
The limited loan office funding led to questions about why the state
was issuing paper money when its main purpose seemed to be to enrich
speculators. Others complained that its real purpose was ‘‘throwing a
tub to the whale, to keep us quiet, and to get hold of the money to
pay your own certificate interest.’’ Philadelphia’s influential merchants
adamantly opposed the entire bill. Despite these challenges, a motley
coalition passed it. One historian concluded that ‘‘the legislation . . .
represented a deal between creditors, paper money advocates, and land
speculators.’’ Pennsylvania would not have adopted paper money without this coalition agreement.17
Legislators voted nearly unanimously against making the money legal
tender. They rejected efforts to provide broad debt relief like that in
South Carolina. By large majorities, they raised taxes and tightened tax
collection to ensure that the paper money could be retired. Pennsylvania’s economic program thus occupied what some viewed as a traditional
and sorely disappointing middle ground.18
Pennsylvania’s paper money emission led unexpectedly to a heated
legislative debate over whether to revoke the charter of the private Bank
of North America founded by Robert Morris. That debate raised concerns over the power of republican majorities that gave it an important
political dimension beyond its role in the contemporary dialogue on
interestedness and civic virtue analyzed by Gordon Wood. As a result,

16. Bouton, Taming Democracy, 91–92; Robert L. Brunhouse, The CounterRevolution in Pennsylvania, 1776–1790 (1942; repr. Harrisburg, PA, 1971), 131–
32, 151.
17. Pennsylvania Evening Herald (Philadelphia), Mar. 5, 1785; Roland M.
Baumann, ‘‘ ‘Heads I Win, Tails You Lose’: The Public Creditors and the
Assumption Issue in Pennsylvania, 1790–1802,’’ Pennsylvania History 44 ( July
1977), 198. Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), Feb. 24,
1785; ibid., Mar. 1, 1785.
18. Pennsylvania General Assembly, Minutes of the Second Session of the Ninth
General Assembly (Philadelphia, 1785), 195–206. Bouton, Taming Democracy,
135–36.
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it significantly widened the controversy over paper money not just in
Pennsylvania but around the country.19
The Bank’s opponents saw its operations as a powerful enemy of state
paper money, which they believed prevented it from trading at par. They
argued that they could revoke its charter in the public interest because
‘‘the happiness of the people is the first law.’’ Westmoreland Constitutionalist party legislator William Findley had spearheaded the fight for
paper money and was a principal leader in the charter debate. He argued
that as an institution that created wealth outside public control the Bank
was fundamentally incompatible with democracy, not just with state
paper money. It was ‘‘an unlimited institution . . . for the sole purpose
of increasing [private] wealth’’ and therefore ‘‘democracy must fall before
it.’’ At least 87 percent of the legislators who supported paper money
also supported the successful effort to revoke the Bank charter.20
In response, longtime Constitutionalist ally Thomas Paine broke ranks
with them. Paine had opposed Robert Morris on various issues, and had
written as recently as early 1785 that ‘‘there may be cases in which paper
money may be generally serviceable.’’ Now he attacked both the charter
revocation and paper money as violative of republican principles. Paine
argued that a first principle of republican government is that in forming
it the people renounce their right of ‘‘breaking and violating their engagements, compacts and contracts’’ with each other. Interference with contracts such as the charter was therefore unconstitutional. He attacked
paper money as an artificial political creation that would inevitably harm
honest laborers, reserving particular scorn for legal tender laws, a ‘‘most
presumptuous attempt at arbitrary power.’’21

19. For Wood’s profile of Pennsylvania legislator William Findley as a representative Anti-Federalist and the Bank debate, see Gordon S. Wood, ‘‘Interests
and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,’’ in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard
Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill, NC, 1987),
69–109.
20. Pennsylvania General Assembly, Debates and Proceedings . . . on the . . .
Charter of the Bank (Philadelphia, 1786), 22, 66. Pennsylvania General Assembly,
Minutes of the Second Session, 204, 212, 367.
21. Thomas Paine to Thomas Fitzsimmons, Apr. 19, 1785, reprinted in Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), Dec. 21, 1785. Thomas Paine, Dissertations on
Government, the Affairs of the Bank, and Paper-Money (Philadelphia, 1786), 7–9,
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Paine’s essay was published in mid-February, 1786. Within four
months, its attack on paper money was excerpted in at least a dozen
newspapers from New Hampshire to South Carolina. The newspapers
linked Paine’s views to his patriotic stature by attributing the essay to the
‘‘author of Common Sense.’’ It elicited replies from leading paper money
advocates in New Jersey, as well as vitriolic attacks on Paine’s character,
including claims that he had been bought. The essay provided a republican rationale for a constitutional ban on contract impairment, and
reframed paper money as a form of contract abuse. It was a highly visible
riposte to repeated 1780s claims that the will of republican majorities
should always govern and that that principle justified paper money and
debtor relief.22
A backlash against the Pennsylvania legislature’s actions began almost
immediately. In the Fall, 1785 assembly elections, fifteen out of seventeen members of the Philadelphia area and Chester County delegations
were replaced. Unlike their predecessors, nearly all of the new legislators
were supporters of Robert Morris and the Bank and opponents of paper
money. This trend continued in the 1786 elections, which gave conservatives a narrow majority. A contemporary observer interpreted the
results this way: ‘‘the late returns of Assemblymen . . . fully evinces that
the Bank of North America has recovered its popularity, and that paper
money has lost its credit throughout the state. On these two points the
late general election turned in every county.’’23

45, 46–48 (quotes on 8, 46). Background: Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (1976; repr. Oxford, UK, 2005), 197–203.
22. Paine’s paper money attack: e.g., New York Packet, Mar. 6, 1786; Massachusetts Centinel (Boston), Mar. 15, 1786; State Gazette of South-Carolina
(Charleston), Apr. 3, 1786; Connecticut Journal (New Haven), Apr. 20, 1786;
The United States Chronicle (Providence, RI), May 18, 1786; New Hampshire
Gazette and General Advertiser (Portsmouth), June 8, 1786. Response: The Political Intelligencer and New-Jersey Advertiser (New Brunswick), May 3, 1786. Paine
was charged with having been paid for his attack, a charge he vigorously denied
and for which no substantial evidence has ever been offered. See Paine’s letter to
the Pennsylvania Packet (Philadelphia), Apr. 4, 1786.
23. Independent Gazetteer, Nov. 27, 1786, quoted in M. L. Bradbury, ‘‘Legal
Privilege and the Bank of North America,’’ The Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography 96 (Apr. 1972), 164; Janet Wilson, ‘‘The Bank of North America
and Pennsylvania Politics: 1781–1787,’’ The Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography 66 (Jan. 1942), 26.
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The paper money controversy in New York strongly resembled that
in Pennsylvania. The state Assembly passed a loan-office bill in 1785,
but it was blocked by the elite state Senate. Merchants hoped that the
Bank of New York would provide sufficient credit. But as in Pennsylvania, rural interests saw the Bank as unhelpful if not downright hostile to
their interests because it did not provide credit to them.24
In 1786, with Governor George Clinton’s support, a coalition persuaded the legislature to approve £200,000 in paper currency. This was
twice the size of the 1785 proposed emission, at least in part because it
now included funds to pay certain public creditors to gain needed support. Though it is doubtless true, as John Kaminski concludes, that there
was some support for paper money throughout the state, in reality support and opposition were geographically highly concentrated. Ernest
Spaulding found that the 1786 voting showed that as in 1785, the ‘‘hardmoney party was located in the southern commercial and maritime counties [in and around New York]; and allied with them was Albany County
with its little commercial city and, in all probability, its great landholders.’’ Spaulding’s conclusion is strongly supported by voting patterns for
the controversy’s most contentious aspect, legal tender status.25
The legislature rejected making the currency legal tender. New York’s
Chamber of Commerce merchants had submitted a lengthy memorial to
the Legislature attacking legal tender status as a fraud, ‘‘replete with
injustice and impolicy’’ that would be ‘‘fatal to commerce.’’ They made
clear that their willingness to accept paper money depended on whether
they would be forced to accept it. The Assembly divided nearly evenly
on the issue, with legislators from New York County, its environs, and
Albany County voting against it by a 78 percent majority, while 86 percent of those from remaining areas supported it. A proposal like South
Carolina’s property tender law was overwhelmingly rejected. Debtors
were instead permitted to tender paper money to most creditors who
sued them, probably deterring some claims. The margin of victory was
24. E. Wilder Spaulding, New York in the Critical Period, 1783–1789 (New
York, 1932), 144–48. Arthur Pendleton Hall II, ‘‘State-issued Bills of Credit and
the United States Constitution: The Political Economy of Paper Money in Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, 1780–1789,’’ PhD diss., University of Georgia, 1991, 192.
25. Spaulding, New York Critical Period, 148. Journal of the Assembly of the
State of New-York . . . Eighth Session (New York, 1785), 145.
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provided by legislators who had opposed legal tender. Legislative divisions over how much debtor relief to provide strongly foreshadowed
later divisions over the Constitution.26
The New York legislation was also a coalition compromise needed to
win passage. One-fourth of the new issue was to be used to pay interest
on public securities, with the remaining three-quarters to be used to fund
loans from the loan office that would primarily benefit farmers and land
speculators. The state also agreed to assume responsibility for about 30
percent of the total federal debt held by New York citizens. Kaminski
finds that unlike the assumed federal debt, which was ‘‘held by approximately half of the state’s voters,’’ the remaining unassumed federal debt
was ‘‘owned by a couple hundred wealthy, and generally anti-Clinton,
New Yorkers.’’ He concludes that ‘‘Clinton and the paper money men
were seeking support for their measures while attempting to divide the
interests of the public creditors.’’27
New Jersey’s paper money politics were similarly divisive. Prosperous
citizens like leading lawyer William Paterson thought that republicanism
meant no ‘‘levelling’’ politics, and hence no paper money. ‘‘True’’ republicans, however, thought very differently. As one wrote, in a ‘‘republican
government . . . the people (the majority of the people) bear rule, and it
is for them to determine w[h]ether a proposition is unjust.’’ The General
Assembly paper money leader, Abraham Clark, wrote that government
should ‘‘help the feeble against the mighty,’’ prevent detrimental inequality of property, and protect land-backed emissions of legal tender paper,
because without them New Jersey would ‘‘sink back into poverty and
abjection’’ and the people would be at the mercy of ‘‘greedy dogs.’’28
New Jersey’s farmers were a large majority of the state’s voters, and
many wanted legal tender paper money. Supporters insisted that a loan
office would provide a needed ‘‘domestic circulating medium.’’ Merchant

26. ‘‘Memorial and Petition of the Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce,’’
New York Packet, Mar. 6, 1786. Journal of the Assembly of the State of New-York
. . . Ninth Session (New York, 1786), 53–54, 57–58, 68. Hall, ‘‘State Issued Bills,’’
196–97.
27. Kaminski, Paper Politics, 148; McDonald, We the People, 294.
28. Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the
Critical Period, 1781–1789 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1950), 71, 73 (italics original).
Ruth Bogin, ‘‘New Jersey’s True Policy: The Radical Republican Vision of Abraham Clark,’’ William and Mary Quarterly 35 (Jan. 1978), 100–109, quote 106.
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and financial interests opposed it, arguing that merchants would be
‘‘totally ruined’’ by it. As in New York, supporters argued in response
that if paper money ruined merchants because they were unable to trade
in specie, that would be good for the state since domestic manufactures
and sales of country produce would grow.29
In mid-1786, the loan-office bill was adopted. The Legislative Council
(the legislature’s upper house) had initially rejected it before agreeing to
it by a one-vote margin. The General Assembly had divided sharply
before agreeing that the paper money should be legal tender. Virginia
Congressman William Grayson, who became a leading Anti-Federalist,
wrote to James Madison about the law: ‘‘This same Jersey bill was one
of the most iniquitous things I ever saw. . . . If Lord Effingham is right
that an act against the Constitution is void, surely paper money with a
tender annexed to it is void, for it is [sic: is it] not an attack upon property, the security of which is made a fundamental in every State in the
Union.’’30
The legislature’s sharp divisions required compromise between paper
money supporters and public creditors before the law could be passed.
The day after passage, the legislature adopted a report proposing added
revenues to pay interest on public securities, the ‘‘overwhelming bulk’’
of which were held in northern New Jersey. One historian concludes
that this was part of a compromise agreement; another finds that interest
on residents’ federal securities was paid using loan-office bills.31
Rhode Island’s actions in 1786–87 hardened public sentiment against
paper money and related debtor relief. It passed loan bank legislation
with legal tender currency in 1786. Pauline Maier writes that the law was
intended to counter deflation and ‘‘meant to allow people to pay their

29. ‘‘Willing to Learn,’’ Dec. 21, 1785, The Political Intelligencer and NewJersey Advertiser (New Brunswick); Curtius, in ibid., Jan. 4, 1786. Jensen, New
Nation, 322.
30. William Grayson to James Madison, Mar. 22, 1786, in The Papers of James
Madison Vol. 8, ed. William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal (Chicago,
1973), 509. New Jersey General Assembly, Votes and Proceedings of the Tenth
General Assembly of the State of New-Jersey . . . Second Sitting (Trenton, NJ,
1786), 80, 82, 83; McCormick, Experiment, 200–202.
31. McCormick, Experiment, 212. Perkins, American Public Finance, 153. E.
James Ferguson, ‘‘State Assumption of the Federal Debt During the Confederation,’’ The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 38 (Dec. 1951), 403–24, 417.
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taxes and support economic development, not to defraud creditors.’’
Another historian concludes that it nevertheless brought the Rhode
Island economy ‘‘to a standstill.’’ Some merchants left the state; others
refused to sell goods, including food, and closed stores. One leading
historian concludes that riots broke out in response; another writes that
the disorder was ‘‘reminiscent of the opening years of the Revolution.’’
Residents complained that ‘‘property is no where secure, houses and
stores have been promiscuously broken into, and many persons have
been wounded in defending their effects from the depredations of the
mob.’’ Within a year, Rhode Island’s currency had depreciated to fourto-one against specie. Residents lodged depreciated currency with courts
to satisfy debts to out-of-state creditors. State law was changed to prevent
nonresidents from using that procedure against Rhode Islanders. The
legislature then passed several pieces of ‘‘forced payment’’ legislation that
compulsorily retired all outstanding state debt for a fraction of its value
in specie. Rather than accommodating public creditors, Rhode Island
had ‘‘swatted’’ them with ‘‘brutal directness.’’ Whether Rhode Island’s
fiscal policies were defensible or not, many Americans fervently condemned them.32
Americans around the country and even sympathetic foreign observers
exploded in outrage over Rhode Island’s policies. In a letter reprinted
by newspapers in eight states, a southern resident wrote to his Rhode
Island correspondent that ‘‘matters have come to such an alarming crisis,
that the confederation must take notice of you . . .’’ for ‘‘your Legislature
. . . are dangerous to the community at large.’’ Many of his state’s citizens
believed that ‘‘when the convention meets in Philadelphia . . . measures
will be taken to reduce you to order and good government, or strike
your State out of the union and annex you to others.’’ Massachusetts
Supreme Court Justice Francis Dana wrote to Elbridge Gerry expressing
the hope that ‘‘a bold politician wou’d seize upon’’ Rhode Island’s
‘‘abominations and anti federal conduct’’ to annihilate it as a state. Philadelphia Convention delegate Richard Dobbs Spaight wrote to North
Carolina leader James Iredell that ‘‘the General Assembly of Connecticut
32. Maier, Ratification, 224. Schweitzer, ‘‘State Issued Currency,’’ 318. Ferguson, Power of the Purse, 243. Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser
(Boston), July 27, 1786. Jensen, New Nation, 324. Irwin H. Polishook, Rhode
Island and the Union, 1774–1795 (Evanston, IL, 1969), 127, 132–33, 145–47,
154–61.
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have reprobated . . . the conduct of . . . Rhode Island. . . . I should not
be surprised if they were to compel them by force to do justice to their
citizens.’’ A Massachusetts resident wrote ‘‘the other states will justly
consider [Rhode Island] as cheats,—traitors to the nation . . . and armed
plunderers of their neighbours.’’ A Connecticut resident wrote that the
law was ‘‘the most extraordinary that ever disgraced the annals of democratical tyranny,’’ an act of ‘‘human depravity.’’ Secretary of War Henry
Knox wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette that ‘‘no little State of Greece
ever exhibited greater turpitude . . . plundering the Orphan and Widow
by virtue of laws.’’ Leading English liberal and longtime American supporter Richard Price described Rhode Island’s ‘‘knavery’’ as a ‘‘triumph’’
for America’s opponents in a letter excerpted in at least thirty-five newspapers.33
Before the Philadelphia Convention began, paper money had been
adopted in nearly half the states only because public creditors had been
given large financial inducements to support it. Pennsylvania’s paper
money and Bank debate had led to much broader concerns about majority power that reinforced opposition to paper money across the country
and resulted in a severe political backlash. Rhode Island’s actions then
created a widely shared perception that one state’s paper money and
debt relief policies could unfairly damage other states’ residents. This
shifting political climate emboldened the Philadelphia Convention in
dealing with the paper money issue and fundamentally hobbled AntiFederalists’ opposition during the ratification debates.



Given colonial practices and the states’ divisions over paper money, the
apparent political path of least resistance for the 1787 Constitution’s
drafters would have been to permit states to issue it, perhaps subject to
Congressional approval to reflect delegates’ concerns about effects on
33. Newport Herald (RI), Apr. 12, 1787, DHRC 13: 80 ; ibid., n1 (Dana
letter). Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell, July 2, 1787 in Griffith John
McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, Vol. 2 (1857; repr. New York,
1949), 162. Massachusetts Gazette (Boston), May 29, 1786. The New-Haven
Gazette and Connecticut Magazine, June 1, 1786, 122. Knox to Lafayette, Apr.
26, 1788, Henry Knox Papers (mf. ed.), Reel 22 (original in Gilder Lehrman
collection, NYHS, GLC02437.03860). Richard Price to Benjamin Rush, Jan. 26,
1787, DHRC 13: 101.
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other states. James Madison had attacked the New Jersey plan during the
Philadelphia Convention because it would not prevent ‘‘trespasses of the
States on each other,’’ such as ‘‘aggressions’’ by emissions of paper
money. Madison argued that ‘‘the Creditor States must suffer unjustly
from every emission by the debtor States.’’ Madison had also used paper
money as a prime example of why Congress should be given a general
veto over state laws. But Madison’s veto proposal was opposed even by
delegates firmly opposed to state paper money such as Gouverneur Morris and was ultimately rejected by the Convention, so delegates needed
to decide how to deal with state paper money and debt relief powers.34
Originally, at least some Philadelphia delegates seem to have been
inclined to accept continued state authority. They would have permitted
states to issue paper money and pass debtor relief laws with Congressional approval, as provided in the August 6, 1787, report of the Convention’s Committee of Detail. But despite a warning from Massachusetts
merchant Nathaniel Gorham, who had just played an important role in
suppressing Shays’ rebellion, that an outright ban would rouse ‘‘the most
desperate opposition from its partizans,’’ late in the Convention a large
majority agreed with Roger Sherman of Connecticut that the Constitution was a ‘‘favorable crisis for crushing paper money.’’ Sherman argued
that ‘‘if the consent of the Legislature [i.e., Congress] could authorize
emissions of it, the friends of paper money would make every exertion
to get into the Legislature in order to license it.’’35
Sherman’s argument is consistent with North Carolina delegate
William Davie’s later statement to the North Carolina ratifying convention
that Philadelphia delegates from the six states that had not adopted paper
money made clear that they did not want to take the chance that they
would be outvoted in Congress and ‘‘shamefully defrauded’’ again. The
Convention proposed a permanent ban on state paper money and many
forms of debtor relief. It did so even though it deferred to state authority
on other sensitive issues such as voting qualifications. The Convention’s
sweeping action not only rejected paper money; it rejected the idea that
state majorities should ever be able actively to manage state economies.

34. Max Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, (1911, 4
vols.; repr. New Haven, CT, 1966), 1: 317–18, 2: 26–28. Holton, Unruly Americans, 182–84.
35. Farrand, Records, 2: 187, 439 (quotes).
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This meant that the Convention majority agreed with Madison that the
problem posed by state paper money and debt relief was a general one,
not an exceptional situation stemming from Rhode Island’s actions. For
several reasons, however, the seemingly high-risk decision to strip states
of these powers would actually turn out to be a relatively small gamble,
as the course of ratification shows.36



The ratification sources suggest that continued popular support for
paper money and debtor relief was a significant undercurrent in many
states’ debates, but this is quite different from saying that it played an
important role in public debate or that it materially influenced ratification
outcomes in most states. Orin Libby’s work shows that there was a very
strong correlation in numerous states between geographic areas whose
representatives had earlier supported paper money and areas that
opposed the Constitution. But the actual strength of that opposition in
practice was a function both of public opinion on other major aspects of
the Constitution and of the willingness (or the unwillingness in many
cases) of Anti-Federalists to challenge Section 10 publicly and aggressively. It is useful to divide the analysis of ratification into two parts:
Rhode Island and North Carolina, on the one hand, and the eleven
remaining states on the other.37
Contemporaries believed that ‘‘whatever ostensible reasons may be
offered’’ by North Carolina and Rhode Island ‘‘for the rejection of this
constitution . . . the true one is the inhibition of paper money.’’ James
Madison thought that in Rhode Island, support and opposition for the
Constitution coincided entirely with views on paper money. A French
observer concluded that Rhode Island’s leaders hoped to ‘‘cause the
rejection of the Constitution, whose design is to curb their excesses’’ by
submitting it to town referenda. Maier and Heideking agree that support
for paper money (or state fiscal policy) played a major role in Rhode
Island’s initial refusal to ratify. They seem inclined to think that that was
true in North Carolina as well, though local factors also played a role.
But these states’ refusals to ratify seem to have had little influence on

36. Holton, Unruly Americans, 185.
37. Orin Grant Libby, The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen
States on the Constitution, 1787–8 (1894; repr. New York, 1969).
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ratification in other states beyond the Federalist ammunition their paper
money experiences provided. Their refusals did not materially alter the
overall course of ratification. The discussion below therefore considers
the contests in the eleven originally ratifying states. It begins by describing the overall contours of the debate, and then looks more closely at the
significance of ratification contests in several states.38



A French observer saw the Constitution’s proposed limits on state economic relief as a major shift in the locus of sovereignty:
The new general Government proposed to the People requires some large Sacrifices
of Sovereignty on the part of the States. Some are painful at this time because the
creation of Paper money, the laws that stay the operation of obligations and Contracts, those that authorize the payment of debts in property, or in depreciated
paper, can no longer take place. Nothing remains to the states of their individual
independence but their Judicial powers . . . inspection and police . . . and internal
administration.39

Federalists saw this shift in power as a virtue and said so repeatedly.
They were happy to advertise it and to defend it in response to scattered
Anti-Federalist attacks. Newspaper articles supporting the Constitution
in part because it would end paper money and tender laws appeared
from South Carolina to Massachusetts. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
wrote in South Carolina that whatever else people thought of the Constitution, they would think it an ‘‘honest one,’’ because ‘‘in future we shall
be free from the apprehensions of paper money, pine barren acts, and
instalment laws.’’ Benjamin Rush wrote to leading Massachusetts minister Jeremy Belknap that if the Constitution ‘‘held forth no other advantages [than] that [of] a future exemption from paper money laws, this
38. Thomas Ruston to George Washington, Aug. 17, 1788, DHRC 18: 335;
Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin, Mar. 16, 1788, DHRC 16: 402–403.
Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 13, 1788, DHRC 18: 401. James Madison to George
Nicholas, Apr. 8, 1788, DHRC 9: 710. Maier, Ratification, 224. Heideking, Constitution, 242. For a similar view, see ‘‘Introduction,’’ DHRC 24, xxxviii. North
Carolina: Maier, Ratification, 415–23; Heideking, 242–44, 328–30.
39. Antoine de la Forest to Comte de Montmorin, Sept. 28, 1787, DHRC 13:
259.
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would be eno’ to recommend it to honest men.’’ A West Jersey resident
wrote in a letter reprinted across the country, ‘‘Nothing, in the whole
federal constitution, is more necessary than [Section 10]; for we find, by
woeful experience, that nothing, neither the religion of nature, nor even
the pure religion of Jesus Christ . . . can make men honest. It was therefore absolutely necessary to guard against . . . the emission of paper
money.’’40
Federalists repeatedly exploited what another French observer saw as
a common ‘‘fear of the abuse of paper money, the terrible weapon, with
which the demagogues attack and destroy the propertied class in general.’’ Letters discussing the views of those skeptical about the Constitution suggest that in doing so Federalists were taking advantage of an
important shift in public sentiment. In late March, 1788, James Freeman,
a Boston Unitarian minister, sent a London Unitarian clergyman a copy
of the Massachusetts ratification debates. He wrote, ‘‘You will find the
constitution less democratick, than might be expected from a people who
are so fond of liberty. Various causes have conspired to render republican sentiments unfashionable; among which may be mentioned Mr. J.
Adams’s publications, a late insurrection in the state of Massachusetts,
and the corrupt proceedings of the legislature of Rhode-Island.’’ His
perception was shared by Samuel Breck of Boston, who wrote to Henry
Knox that Rhode Island’s ‘‘villanous conduct’’ was one of the two main
reasons that would ‘‘shew the necessity of parting with a greater share
of our Priviledges . . . than we have been willing to do at any former
time.’’41
40. Columbian Herald (Charleston, SC), Feb. 14, 1788, DHRC 13: 274, n1.
Benjamin Rush to Jeremy Belknap, Feb. 28, 1788, DHRC 16: 250–52, quote 251.
Also quoted in Wood, ‘‘Interests and Disinterestedness,’’ 108. Extract of a Letter
from Salem County, West Jersey, Oct. 22, 1787, DHRC 3: 140–41. ‘‘Publicola,’’
State Gazette of North Carolina (Newbern), Mar. 20, 1788, DHRC 16: 439; Virginia Independent Chronicle (Richmond), Feb. 13, 1788, DHRC 8: 396; Virginia
Independent Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1788, DHRC 9: 565; ‘‘A Pennsylvanian [Tench
Coxe] to the New York Convention,’’ Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia), June
11, 1788, DHRC 20: 1139–49; ‘‘A Dialogue Between Mr. Z and Mr. &,’’ Massachusetts Centinel (Boston), Oct. 31, 1787, DHRC 4: 177–78.
41. Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin, Mar. 16, 1788, DHRC 16:
403. James Freeman to Theophilus Lindsey, Mar. 29, 1788, DHRC 16: 504;
Samuel Breck to Henry Knox, July 14, 1787, Reel 20, Knox Papers (mf. ed.)
(original in Gilder Lehrman Collection, NYHS, GLC02437.03604).
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The profound political difficulties posed for Anti-Federalists by this
perceived shift in public opinion were candidly acknowledged by at least
one major Anti-Federalist writer, the ‘‘Federal Farmer.’’ In his ‘‘Letters
to the Republican,’’ the Federal Farmer wrote that ‘‘several legislatures,
by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just
cause of uneasiness to creditors. . . . The conduct of several legislatures,
touching paper money and tender laws, has prepared many honest men
for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have
thought of.’’ Saul Cornell astutely observes that the Federal Farmer
sought to persuade his readers that he was ‘‘not just a dispassionate
commentator on political matters but was the true voice of the middling
sort.’’ Written to defeat the Constitution and widely circulated, these
letters constitute strong friendly advice to Anti-Federalists not to try to
defend state economic management powers because ‘‘several legislatures’’ (i.e., not just Rhode Island) had abused them. That has prepared
the ‘‘weight of the community, the men of middling property,’’ who
are neither ‘‘little insurgents’’ or ‘‘dangerous’’ aristocrats but are caught
between those ‘‘two fires,’’ to be willing to accept the Constitution. The
writer argues that this large middle group is going to accept it if AntiFederalists defend those abuses. The evidence suggests that many AntiFederalists took this advice to heart, and that it strongly shaped their
challenges to the ban when they challenged it at all.42
When northern Anti-Federalists of the middling sort objected publicly
to the Constitution’s paper money ban, it was primarily as a harmful
limitation on states’ revenue-raising powers that would lead to their collapse, not because it prevented increased circulation of money or disabled them from shielding the poor against the overbearing rich in hard
times. This was an effort to merge opposition to Section 10 with opposition to federal taxation, an often popular cause. In New York, ‘‘Brutus’’
(Anti-Federalist delegate Robert Yates) wrote that the ban meant that
states would be limited to relying on direct taxation, and that as a result
eventually ‘‘the legislatures of all the states will find it impossible to raise
monies to support their governments. . . . and they must dwindle away.’’
An Albany, New York Anti-Federal Committee circular of April 10,
1788, listed the ban on state coinage and paper money as one of the

42. The Federal Farmer, ‘‘Letters to the Republican,’’ Nov. 8, 1787, DHRC
19: 210–11, 239–40. Cornell, The Other Founders, 89.
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factors that proved the Constitution would create a ‘‘consolidated government, repugnant to the principles of a republican government, not
founded on the preservation but the destruction of state governments.’’
Anti-Federalists also claimed that the ban was illogical and ignored past
history. In New York, De Witt Clinton (writing as ‘‘A Countryman’’)
claimed that although states were barred from issuing paper money, the
federal government was not, which was inconsistent, and that states had
managed paper money better. Delegate William Findley had made nearly
identical claims in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.43
Federalists had two basic responses to Anti-Federalists’ arguments that
the paper money ban would harm states. They claimed that federal control over coinage and currency must be exclusive, and that Rhode
Island’s actions were proof enough of this: ‘‘For want of such a power,
what vile proceedings have of late disgraced almost every legislative measure of Rhode Island! . . . honest creditors in Massachusetts, have been
paid in old horses and enormous rocks.’’ Their second argument was that
this limit on state powers was appropriate to prevent abuses. In New
York, the Albany Federal Committee responded to an Anti-Federalist
challenge to the ban: ‘‘In many of the states . . . [paper currency] has
opened a door to fraud, villany and discord—in Rhode Island it is at
present a lawful tender, though going at twelve for one . . . it is high time
that the wicked and fraudulent system of paper money be checked.’’
Federalist criticisms often lumped together paper money and tender
laws, just as Section 10 did. In the Pennsylvania convention, Jasper
Yeates argued, ‘‘What have been the effects of tender laws, emissions of
paper money, or the destruction of contracts? All faith has been destroyed amongst us. . . . The principles of morality have been impaired;
and if virtue is the foundation of a republic, we have been sapping it as
fast as we could. If state governments are prevented from exercising these
powers, it will produce respectability.’’44
In private, one Massachusetts Anti-Federalist ratification delegate,
43. Brutus I, New York Journal, Oct. 18, 1787, DHRC 13: 411–21, quote on
415. Albany Anti-Federal Committee Circular, Apr. 10, 1788, DHRC 21: 1380–
81. ‘‘A Countryman V,’’ New York Journal, Jan. 17, 1788, DHRC 20: 624;
William Findley, Dec. 5, 1787, DHRC 2: 506.
44. Cassius VI, Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 18, 1787, DHRC 5: 482 (emphasis original). Albany Federal Committee, ‘‘An Impartial Address,’’ c. Apr. 20,
DHRC 21: 1392. Jasper Yeates, Nov. 30, 1787, DHRC 2: 436.
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William Symmes, Jr., went further than most Anti-Federalists did publicly, defending both states’ ability to issue paper money (for state fiscal
purposes only) and property tender laws. However, Symmes perceived
the potential abuse of state economic powers as a general problem (not
one limited to Rhode Island) that could justify Congressional supervision. He wrote that individual states could abuse tender-law powers and
‘‘impose on’’ other states, and that ‘‘Congress should even have power
to say hereafter when they shall cease.’’ But Massachusetts AntiFederalists did not publicly challenge Section 10 despite Symmes’s prediction that ‘‘the principal weight of opposition will hang’’ on it, and
though another well-informed observer concluded that in Massachusetts
a ‘‘most powerfull host’’ including supporters of paper money and tender
laws and ‘‘18 or 20 who were actually in Shases army’’ were convention
delegates. Given the immense pressure on both sides, due to the extreme
closeness of the Massachusetts vote, to use every available resource and
argument, this suggests that Anti-Federalists thought that they would not
gain votes by a public challenge, and might even lose some.45
In Massachusetts, ‘‘Candidus’’ (merchant and Anti-Federalist writer
Benjamin Austin) did propose before the state Convention began that
state powers over paper money, tender laws, and contracts be preserved,
but used only subject to Congressional approval. However, neither in
Massachusetts nor elsewhere did Anti-Federalists adopt Candidus’s
position in convention dissents or proposed amendments. This is particularly remarkable since precisely that compromise had apparently
appealed to at least some Philadelphia Convention delegates and would
have reflected the diversity of opinion in the states without actually committing anyone to support future legislation.46
An ever-present reality haunted Anti-Federalist arguments about
paper money and tender laws: widespread disgust at Rhode Island’s
actions. Like Brutus, New York ratification convention delegate Melancton Smith argued that proposed federal taxation powers would crush
state governments, and that states should not be deprived of economic
powers simply because they had made mistakes. He then added an

45. William Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr., Nov. 15, 1787, DHRC 4: 236–
45, quotes on 240–41. Nathaniel Gorham to James Madison, Jan. 27, 1788,
DHRC 7: 1552. Symmes voted to ratify based on proposed amendments.
46. ‘‘Candidus II,’’ Independent Chronicle, Dec. 20, 1787, DHRC 5: 494.
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important qualification: ‘‘As for Rhode-Island, I do not mean to justify
her. . . . If there were in the world but one example of political depravity,
it would be hers: And no nation has ever merited or suffered a more
genuine infamy, than a wicked administration has attached to her character.’’ Smith’s remarkably strong sentiments echoed those of George
Washington, who wrote that ‘‘the infamy of the conduct of Rhode Island
outgoes all precedent.’’47
The visceral dislike many Americans felt for Rhode Island’s policies
created an inescapable dilemma for Anti-Federalists: If they defended
state economic relief powers, they had to do so without defending Rhode
Island’s actions, which to many perfectly demonstrated that states should
not be free to act without restraint. This dilemma could have been
avoided by advocating Congressional approval of state paper money
issues, but as noted that compromise failed to gain Anti-Federalist support. Hemmed in by Rhode Island’s actions and lack of a workable fallback position, Anti-Federalists of the ‘‘middling sort’’ were compelled to
fight on narrow ground, often by claiming harm to state fiscal interests
from a ban. And this was only the beginning of their problems, as a
closer look at ratification in three mid-Atlantic states will show.
In Pennsylvania, Kaminski concludes that ‘‘Antifederalists throughout
the state objected to the Constitution partly because of the prohibition
against future state paper money.’’ There was some public AntiFederalist opposition on that issue, but it was narrowly framed. AntiFederalist leaders such as William Findley claimed that Federalists, particularly Benjamin Rush, were inconsistent in promoting the ban because
they had previously supported state paper money. Rush denied that,
claiming he had not supported the law ultimately adopted. As noted,
Findley also claimed that the Constitution was inconsistent in banning
state paper money while permitting the federal government to issue it.48
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist delegates included major leaders of the
state’s popular movement, William Findley and Robert Whitehill. Both
represented areas that had strongly supported popular reforms including

47. Melancton Smith, New York debates, June 27, 1788, DHRC 22: 1924
(punctuation modernized). Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., July 20, 1788,
DHRC 18: 274.
48. Kaminski, Paper Politics, 80. Pennsylvania debates, DHRC 2: 458–95,
506.
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paper money. Neither seems to have been a large enough war-debt speculator that it would have significantly affected his stance toward the Constitution. When they chose to challenge the paper money ban only on
inconsistency grounds, it is fair to infer that they thought that they would
lose rather than gain support by attacking it more broadly, since they
challenged the Constitution on literally dozens of other points. The
extensive dissent of the Anti-Federalist minority issued by Findley and
others after the Pennsylvania convention does not mention paper money
or debt relief.49
The Pennsylvania dissent in turn quickly became the subject of a
widely disseminated Federalist ridicule on the basis that it hid the true
reasons for Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists’ opposition—their support for
paper money and debt relief. An extensive attack on the dissenters published in New York criticized Pennsylvania’s revocation of the Bank charter: ‘‘There is not a spot in the United States, where the solemnity of
contracts and grants has been so sacrilegiously violated . . . as by you
and your junto . . . except only, in the little detestable corner of the
Continent, called Rhode-Island.’’ These attacks suggest that Federalists
thought that Anti-Federalists were vulnerable on those issues. Others
thought so as well. Philadelphia lawyer Charles Swift wrote an English
correspondent that ‘‘in this country’’ the Constitution has ‘‘a majority of
friends amongst the rich and wealthy and amongst the extreme poor.’’
He continued, ‘‘You can have no idea of the enthusiastic zeal [for the
Constitution] that prevails in this city. A man hazards ill-usage and insult
who dares avow his disapprobation. The [desire?] of the extreme poor
and the wealthy for this government may be traced to the same source—
the positive disallowance of paper money—a circumstance that always
falls heaviest on those classes.’’50
Terry Bouton argues, however, that Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists did
not contest such issues more vigorously because they were divided, with
western Pennsylvanians representing ordinary citizens suppressing their
49. McDonald, We the People, 179–80. DHRC 2: 505–506.
50. ‘‘America’’ [Noah Webster], ‘‘To the Dissenting Members of the late Convention of Pennsylvania,’’ Daily Advertiser (New York), Dec. 31, 1787, DHRC
19: 492. Charles Swift to Robert E. Griffiths, Oct. 18, 1787, DHRC 2: 199. ‘‘The
Protest of the Minority,’’ Pennsylvania Gazette, Oct. 3, 1788, DHRC 2: 155–56
(reprinted from Vermont to South Carolina).
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views on paper money and debt revaluation in order to gain support
from elite eastern Anti-Federalists, some of whom were large war-debt
speculators, for efforts to overturn ratification through a subsequent Harrisburg convention. But the evidence suggests instead that paper money
support had collapsed in some parts of the state. Large parts of Pennsylvania that had previously supported paper money and opposed the Bank
of North America charter now strongly supported the Constitution.
Nearly every delegate from Philadelphia City and County, and Bucks,
Northampton, and Northumberland counties, all of whom represented
areas that had strongly supported the paper money law, now supported
the Constitution. At least 54 percent of the total convention approval
vote came from areas that defected from the earlier paper money coalition, strong evidence that it could not withstand the Constitution’s overall appeal. These divisions strongly suggest that even had the Federalists
not rushed the Pennsylvania convention, the outcome on Section 10
would not have changed.51
In New York, most Federalists regarded Section 10’s ban as a strength
that should be promoted. In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton
defended the Constitution’s judiciary provisions using paper money laws
as a prime example of the evils they would suppress. As discussed above,
Anti-Federalists attacked the ban on narrow state fiscal solvency grounds.
New York ratification saw large coalition defections like those in Pennsylvania. While New York-area Assembly representatives had supported
paper money legislation in 1786 by a 2 to 1 margin (19–9), ratification
delegates from New York and its surrounding areas now unanimously
supported the Constitution (26–0). The New York-area delegates provided 80 percent of the total votes for the Constitution. Former paper
money supporters from other areas, however, became Anti-Federalists
who almost uniformly opposed the Constitution. All seven ratification
delegates from outside the New York commercial area who voted for
paper money as legislators in 1786 and also voted on ratification opposed it. Although it seems possible that Anti-Federalists were a majority
in the New York convention and would have had the votes needed to

51. Bouton, Taming Democracy, 191–93. Mar. 16, 1785, paper money vote,
Pennsylvania General Assembly, Minutes of the Second Session, 212, compared to
Dec. 12, 1787 ratification vote, DHRC 2: 590–91.
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advocate changes to Section 10 had they been united on it, they did not
do so in their proposed amendments.52
In New Jersey, the Constitution was highly popular. According to
Forrest McDonald, nearly all legislators who had supported paper money
had been re-elected and its supporters remained in control of the legislature during ratification. However, Abraham Clark, the ‘‘true republican’’
leader of state paper money forces, who was also a strong debt relief
advocate, chose not to challenge the Constitution. There is no known
evidence that Clark owned significant amounts of public securities.
Accounts of New Jersey ratification make clear that preserving the state’s
economic relief powers was nowhere near important enough to have
formed the basis for a successful challenge to the Constitution because,
as Holton concludes, the Constitution’s tax powers meant far less state
taxation (and indirect taxation from New York) and increased payments
to public creditors. Clark’s neutrality on ratification acknowledged the
reality that challenging the paper money ban would have made no difference to the outcome.53
Thus, although many Anti-Federalists across the country remained
paper money supporters, they lost their public creditor allies in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. These creditor defections meant that
paper money support in those states was once again the minority position it had been until creditors joined coalitions there. The Constitution
essentially restored the status quo ante by destroying the appeal of state
paper money to those public creditors. The reason for their defection
from the state paper money coalitions is straightforward: the Constitution
offered them a far better financial deal than state paper money. As Max
Edling points out, Federalists promised during ratification that once the
Constitution was adopted, federal debts that had been assumed by states
would revert to Congress. The widely anticipated federal specie-based
impost would provide a clearly superior financial basis for repaying federal debts to creditors, even if state debt assumption did not occur.54
52. The Federalist, ed. J. R. Pole (Cambridge, UK, 2005), 422. Compare
Assembly vote, Mar. 6, 1786, in Daily Advertiser (New York), Apr. 5, 1786, with
DHRC 21: 1356 and DHRC 23: 2323 and related data.
53. McDonald, We the People, 123–29. Holton, Unruly Americans, 15. McCormick, Experiment, 205. Heideking, Constitution, 225.
54. Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S.
Constitution and the Making of the American State (Oxford, UK, 2003), 160.
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Federalist Pelatiah Webster therefore advocated the Constitution by
arguing that ‘‘I wish the public creditors to look to themselves. . . . It is,
moreover, only from a federal treasury that the public creditors, of all
descriptions, can expect substantial and permanent justice.’’ That federal
securities speculators uniformly agreed with Webster is evident from the
sharply rising prices of federal debt securities and the falling value of
paper money backed by state imposts as the prospects for ratification of
the Constitution increased. Merchants would also benefit from the paper
money ban. Both of these somewhat overlapping groups chose for the
most part to support the Constitution.55
As Alfred Young points out, urban artisans and mechanics in several
states joined them, voting overwhelmingly for Federalists in selecting
ratifying convention delegates, often, he thinks, due to economic desperation that ‘‘trumped traditional class allegiances.’’ Heideking concludes
broadly that in convention elections there was an ‘‘almost unanimous
tendency of the urban lower and middle classes to vote Federalist.’’ In
his view, urban lower- and middle-class residents supported the Constitution because they thought their interests were convergent with those of
merchants and other urban elites. Whether their interests were actually
convergent or not, their actions comported with ‘‘Marcus’s’’ realpolitik
advice that ‘‘it is the interest of the mechanicks to join the mercantile
interest, because it is not their interest to quarrel with their bread and
butter.’’56
In the southern states, some elite Anti-Federalist leaders challenged
Section 10, but to little effect. Luther Martin of Maryland and Rawlins
Lowndes of South Carolina attacked restrictions on state paper money
and economic relief powers. Martin argued that Maryland and other
states had ‘‘formerly received great benefit from paper emissions,’’ and

55. ‘‘A Citizen of Philadelphia,’’ Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 23, 1788, DHRC
2: 660, quoted in part in Edling, Revolution, 161. Ferguson, Power of the Purse,
256–57. Delegates with securities or commercial interests were significantly more
likely to support the Constitution. Robert A. McGuire, ‘‘The Founding Era:
1774–1791,’’ in Price Fishbeck et al., Government and the American Economy: A
New History (Chicago, 2007), 75–77.
56. Alfred F. Young, Liberty Tree: Ordinary People and the American Revolution (New York, 2006), 62. Tradesmen, artisans, and mechanics ally with Federalists: Heideking, Constitution, 227, 248–49 (quote on 248). Massachusetts Gazette,
Oct. 26, 1787, quoted in Beard, Economic Interpretation, 302.
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that prohibiting debt relief and tender laws would allow wealthy creditors to destroy poor but industrious debtors. But their objections did
not noticeably increase opposition or lead to proposed amendments.
Both states ratified by comfortable margins.57
In Virginia several elite Anti-Federalists, including George Mason,
William Grayson, and Richard Henry Lee, publicly supported the prohibition on state paper money. Their colleague Patrick Henry’s reasoning
in the Virginia convention is illuminating: ‘‘But, then comes paper
money. We are at peace on this subject. Though this is a thing which
that mighty Federal Convention had no business with, yet I acknowledge
that paper money would be the bane of this country. I detest it. . . . It is
at rest however in this Commonwealth. It is no longer solicited or advocated.’’ Henry’s comments made a virtue out of weakness. Virginia’s
legislature had unanimously rejected both paper money and debt relief
proposals in late 1787. Under the circumstances, challenging Section 10
publicly risked losing the Anti-Federalists votes they could not afford to
lose in Virginia’s extremely closely divided convention.58



Even if on the whole one views skeptically Charles Beard’s economic
interpretation of the Constitution, the ratification evidence makes clear
that he was right to conclude that ‘‘personalty’’ property interests played
an important part in the struggle over it, though he may have overstated
their significance. Contemporaries understood that personalty interests
stood to benefit handsomely from the Constitution’s tax provisions and
Section 10’s wealth protections, and that perception clearly influenced
both sides during ratification. But the ratification evidence does not support Beard’s claim (or variants of it made by later historians), that the
reason Section 10 survived was Federalist process manipulation. Nor
does it support Cecilia Kenyon’s conclusion as to Section 10 that ‘‘the
response of the Anti-Federalists . . . can accurately be described, I think,

57. Farrand, Records, 3: 214. Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution. . . , 2nd ed. (5 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1836), 4: 289–90. Maier, Ratification, 248.
58. Elliot, Debates, 3: 156. Bushrod Washington to Robert Carter, Nov. 4,
1787, DHRC 8: 144; John Dawson to James Madison, Sept. 25, 1787, DHRC 8:
17n4.
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as one of over-all approbation tempered by some doubts caused by fear
that they would be applied retroactively.’’59
By mid-1787, state economic management had lost some of its luster.
Its already limited popularity declined due to a generally improving
economy, strong backlash against policies such as Pennsylvania’s Bank
charter revocation, and owing to the harshly negative reaction to Rhode
Island’s actions. The Constitution’s proposed federal taxation powers
strongly appealed to public creditors, leading to defections from key state
paper money coalitions. Taken together, these developments turned protecting state economic management and relief powers into a cause that
many Anti-Federalists chose not to defend at all. Others—typically the
‘‘middling sort’’—defended them as well as they could on the ground
that state finances could not survive otherwise or that Federalists were
inconsistent, while still others—mostly elite Anti-Federalists in southern
states—defended them on their merits but without discernible results.
Some elite Anti-Federalists even publicly supported Section 10.60
The evidence presented here supports the conclusion that strongly
challenging Section 10 would not have helped and might well have
harmed Anti-Federalists in the three states most critical to ratification:
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. Anti-Federalists had strong convention support and reasonable publicity for their views there, but nevertheless effectively conceded or at most weakly defended the Section 10
issue in them. After public creditor defections, minority support for
paper money remained in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The
very limited ‘‘middling sort’’ opposition to Section 10 there reflected
that, not Federalist process manipulation. In Maryland and South Carolina, the elite challenge to Section 10 was broader but aided little. It is
entirely possible that paper money forces remained in the majority in
Rhode Island and North Carolina, which like Georgia ultimately ratified
either due to coercion or for extraneous reasons, but those peripheral
states were powerless to prevent ratification. In the end, Anti-Federalists
did not propose that the Section 10 ban be reversed in any of the thirteen

59. Cecilia M. Kenyon, ‘‘Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the
Nature of Representative Government,’’ William and Mary Quarterly 12 ( Jan.
1955), 3–43, quote on 32.
60. Economy: see Jensen, The New Nation, 249–57; McCraw, Founders and
Finance, sources in 375n4.
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states, despite proposing hundreds of amendments. A reasonable inference from this evidence is that during ratification paper money advocates
were probably in the minority in at least eight and possibly nine or ten
states, since six states had never adopted paper money in the mid-1780s.
Even eight states would have been an amendment-proof majority supporting Section 10.61
During ratification, Federalists appear to have had advantages in areas
such as control of the media. Federalists also manipulated the ratification
process where they had the ability to do so, by rushing the process,
seeking up-or-down votes on the Constitution, and preventing a second
convention. And Federalists altered the political agenda by proposing a
Constitution that contained taxation power appealing not only to public
creditors but, as Woody Holton argues, to many taxpayers. That shift
may well have significantly influenced opposition to ratification in some
paper money states, but very probably not enough of them to change the
Section 10 outcome. However, as the preceding paragraph’s analysis of
ratification in various states and groups of states shows, there is no
evidence that these Federalist advantages in the ratification process
(whether deemed real or suppositious flaws) would materially have
changed the outcome on Section 10.62
In sum, the evidence suggests that it is mistaken to think that the
Constitution’s ban on paper money and tender laws was accepted
because a strong popular economic reform movement was overwhelmed
by an illegitimate process corrupted by a wealthy, powerful elite and that
Anti-Federalist leaders ‘‘sold out’’ the people. Instead, it strongly suggests that in most states, opposing Section 10 was the Anti-Federalists’
toughest challenge. They met it as well as they could without sacrificing
their ability to attack what they saw as the Constitution’s greater evils.

61. Georgia: Heideking, Constitution, 225–26.
62. Criticisms of ratification based on convention malapportionment are anachronistic.
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